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NUMBER 2

In the next few years, the United States Supreme Court, unless
it avoids the question by retrogression to earlier standards of what
is an appropriate question for judicial resolution, must meet the question of whether government funds may constitutionally be allocated
to church schools. Professor Kurland, generally regarded as the leading United States expert on legal matters pertaining to church and
state, discusses this question from the legal, political and cultural
standpoints.

POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION:
FEDERAL AID TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLSt
PhilipB. Kurland*

As

history measures time, it was not too long ago that
politics, sex and religion were subjects that could not
be properly broached in polite society. Today, if these subjects were eliminated from social conversation, a deathly
silence would fall upon the world. So, too, politics, sex and
religion were once beyond the ken of Supreme Court jurisdiction. If cases involving these matters were to be removed
from the Supreme Court's current docket, it would be shorn
of about half of its business. It is, therefore, without apology
that I offer this paper that deals with both politics and relit
*

This article derives from a speech delivered at the University of Wyoming
on March 16, 1966, under the auspices of the University Public Exercises
Committee.
Professor of Law, University of Chicago; A.B. 1942, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B. 1944, Harvard University; Member of the New York Bar, 1945.
Before joining the Department of Justice in 1946, Professor Kurland served
as clerk to Judge Jerome N. Frank and Justice Felix Frankfurter. From
1947 to 1950, he practiced law in New York City. At the University of
Chicago, Professor Kurland teaches courses in federal jurisdiction, civil
procedure and constitutional law, and conducts seminars on the United
States Supreme Court and constitutional law. He is author of "Religion
and the Law," co-author of "Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United
States" and "Bender's Federal Practice Forms," was a co-editor of "Mr.
Justice" and has authored and edited numerous other legal publications.
In 1949-50 Professor Kurland was selected A Guggenheim Fellow.
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gion. As for sex, you'll have to find your titillations elsewhere.'
Two church-state questions are looming on the Supreme
Court's horizon that may make all of its earlier decisions
on the subject pale into insignificance. The first is the question of the constitutionality of tax-exemption for church-owned property. This issue was recently placed on the Court's
doorstep by the notorious Madalyn Murray,2 obviously encouraged by her successful efforts to secure a constitutional
ban on bible-reading and prayers in public schools.' The
Court may not open its 'doors to receive this bundle of joy,
but sooner rather than later the question will be answered
by it. Until now the Court has shrugged off the issue by ruling
that it is not "a substantial federal question," 4 technical
language for saying "don't bother us."
The second question, and the one I should talk about
today, is whether government funds may properly be allocated to church schools. This issue was made imminent by
the Education Act of 1965.' Federal aid to parochial education had not heretofore been presented for Supreme Court
adjudication. It is certainly not a question that can be
designated as insubstantial. If the Court is to avoid this
question, it will have to retrogress to earlier standards of
what is an appropriate question for judicial resolution.
The tax-exemption issue is one of major concern to all
organized religions. The parochial school problem is, for
the time being at least, of importance primarily to Catholics.
"About 92 per cent of all children attending private schools
in America today are enrolled in Catholic elementary and
secondary schools." 7
1. When this was first written, I did not know that "tiltillating" sexual
interests were federal crimes punishable by five years in jail. Ginzburg v.
United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 969 (1966). I am, therefore, relieved that I so
wisely abstained.
2. Murray v. Comptroller, 216 A.2d 897 (Md. 1966).
3. Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, 179 A.2d 698, rev'd sub nom. Abington
Township School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
4. See Kauper, The Constitutionality of Tax Exemptions for Religious Activitieo, in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 95 (Oaks ed. 1963)
(hereinafter cited as OAKS).
5. 79 Stat. 27 (1965), 20 U.S.C.A. § 821 (Supp. 1965).
6. See Brown, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Cuetodes? - The School--Prayer Cases,
1963 SuP. CT. REv. 1.
7. Drinan, The Constitutionality of Public Aid to Parochial Schools, in OAKS,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 57.
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There are two major aspects of the problem of governmental aid to religious education that I will treat here: the
political and the constitutional. They may not, in fact, differ
in substance but they are at least different in time. I should
like first, therefore, to look backward to the legislative history before I look forward to the constitutional problem that
the Supreme Court will be called upon to decide.
Although national government aid to education can be
traced back at least as far as the Northwest Ordinance of
1787, antedating the Constitution itself, it is sufficient for
our purposes to examine the history that begins but a generation ago. And in doing so, I shall limit myself to aid at the
grammar school and high school level. The question of assistance to colleges and universities presents a different countenance.
In 1938, the Advisory Commission on Education reported
to President Roosevelt-and in 1955 the White House Conference on Education reported to President Eisenhowerthat the states were not providing adequate educational
opportunities for their grammar and high school pupils. In
some instances this was because the states were not willing
to allocate sufficient resources to the purpose. In other cases,
it was because the states lacked the resources to allocate to
such an endeavour. As is so often the case in our time when
the states prove unwilling or unable to meet their responsibilities, the answer proposed is federal financial aid.
In 1938, Senators Harrison of Mississippi and Thomas
of Utah introduced a bill to provide such financing. That
bill never got beyond the stage of extensive committee hearings. It took more than a quarter-century to bring the required
legislation to fruition.
The period between 1938 and 1964 revealed the power
of coalescing minorities to prevent the effectuation of legislation supported in principle at all times by a majority of
the legislators. Throughout this period there were three
issues around which controversy raged. The first was the
question of federal assumption of state powers and responsibilities. Here, although conservatives like Everett Dirksen
of Illinois, then in the House, and Robert Taft of Ohio, in
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1966
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the Senate, led the fight for federal aid, there were always
a group of stalwarts opposed to federal entry in the field
of elementary and secondary education, including such Republican moderates as President Eisenhower and Vice-President Nixon.
The second flaming issue was that of school segregation,
fanned iL 1954 by the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Education.8 On this question there were those typified by Adam Clayton Powell, with his great strength in
the later stages in the House Committee on Labor and Education, who opposed any legislation that did not require 'desegregation as a condition for federal aid. On the other side
were those like Congressman Howard W. Smith, chairman
of the powerful Rules Committee, who would not tolerate
legislation that did require such desegregation.
The third problem was euphemistically referred to as
the question of aid to "private schools." On this issue there
were legislators who opposed any aid that included benefits
to parochial schools, balanced by those who would not support assistance to public schools unless some assistance was
also forthcoming for church schools. This religious school
question issue reached its first nadir, in 1949-50, when the
Barden bill to aid elementary education excluded aid for
parochial schools. Cardinal Spellman publicly attacked Congressman Barden and his" disciples of discrimination."' And
when Eleanor Roosevelt announced her opposition to federal
aid to parochial education, the Cardinal attacked her too.
Concluding an "open letter" to Mrs. Roosevelt, he wrote:
"For whatever you may say in the future, your record of
anti-Catholicism stands for all to see-a record which you
yourself wrote on the pages of history which cannot be recalled-documents of discrimination unworthy of an American mother."'" The immediate cause of aid to parochial education was hardly helped by the Cardinal's choleric temperament, so frequently displayed on issues of church and state.
But the possibility of aid to public schools was certainly severe8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. Lachman, The Cardinal, the Congressmen, and the First Lady, 8 J.
CHURCH & STATE 35, 41 (1965).
10. Id. at 46.
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ly damaged. I refer to this unfortunate controversy not to
rake up old coals, but because it typifies the manner in which
this issue was debated both on and off the floor of Congress.
Sometimes one and sometimes another of these three
questions was centerstage. Each of them was always present.
No single group was strong enough to prevent legislation
for general aid to elementary education. It took a combination of at least two of them to frustrate the general objective.
But that combination was always available.
In 1960, it was the House Rules committee that was
responsible for killing the relevant bill, although it was clear
that had it passed Congress it would have been vetoed by
President Eisenhower, who was opposed to any direct financial aid to the states for this purpose. His attitude, concurred in as it was by Nixon, made an important issue in
the presidential campaign of that year, for Senator Kennedy
was deeply committed to the passage of a school-aid bill and
pledged its accomplishment if he were elected.
It is rather ironical that America's first Catholic president should have what he labelled "probably the most important piece of domestic legislation" in his program defeated
by his coreligionists. Kennedy's Boswells are in some disagreement about the prime responsibility for the defeat of
the 1961 bill. Schlesinger conceded that it was the Catholic
bloc of 88 members of the House of Representatives-in conjunction with Republicans-that was responsible.1 1 Sorenson
says that the President preferred to place the blame elsewhere.1" Certainly the Catholic bloc could not have defeated
the legislation by itself. It is clear, however, that the religious
issue was the major one exposed. Kennedy had announced,
both in the campaign and after his election, that federal aid
to parochial schools was unconstitutional. It was certainly
politically expedient for him to do so."3 After election, he
received support for his position in a brief, not from his
11.

12.

ScHLEsiNGER, A THOUSAND DAYS
SORENSON, KENNEDY 362 (1965).

662 (1965).

13. In 1963, Theodore Sorenson, special counsel to President Kennedy, had
publicly acknowledged: "While it should not be impossible to find an
equitable constitutional framework to settle the church-school aid problem,
it is difficult for the formula to be suggested by the nation's first Catholic
President." Quoted in Lachman, supra note 9, at 35.
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Attorney General, but from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. 4
In 1962, general aid-to-education legislation was moribund. In that year and the two that followed, emphasis shifted to aid to higher education, and important legislation was
enacted to this end, at least some of which will also face
First Amendment religion clauses tests in the not too distant future."
In January 1965, President Johnson demanded of Congress legislation providing federal aid for state elementary
and secondary education. Aware that prior legislation had
foundered in controversies over proposed amendments sought
by special interests, the Johnson forces summarily rejected
all proposals for change or delay. Within three months, the
administration bill was law. This accomplisbment was made
possible in part by the earlier dissipation of opposition bases.
The segregation question had been disposed of by the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited 'discrimination on the
basis of color in any program receiving federal assistance.
Those opposed to federal intervention in the province of the
states had suffered a disastrous defeat in the 1964 elections.
The parochial school advocates, shorn of allies and offered
the possibilities of some very substantial benefits, could not
extract the higher price of direct aid. If they should prove
able to sustain the 1965 legislation against constitutional
attack, however, they will have secured extensive immediate
benefits and even greater claims on future assistance. Of
the three dissident groups, only this one succeeded in making
the administration pay heavily for the elimination of its
opposition.
Before leaving this phase of the story, I should report
on the policy arguments offered by each side and on the content of the legislation secured by the Johnson administration.
The substantive arguments are difficult to uncover. Of the
hundreds of pages of rhetoric, very little can be 'distilled
in the form of reasoned analysis.
14.

U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, IMPACT OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION UPON FEDEAI, AD To EDUCATION S.

Doc. No. 29, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
15. See 77 HARv. L. REV. 1353 (1964).
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For the Catholic position, the following propositions
can be gleaned or constructed. Catholics cannot continue to
support an expansive parochial school system without substantial assistance from the state. A Catholic cannot get the
education that his faith demands of him except in a parochial
school. Freedom of education, which the Constitution allegedly guarantees, therefore, will become a myth rather than a
reality, in the absence of the availability of federal funds.
Moreover, the American cultural heritage is dependent upon
a diversity that can be preserved only through the continuance
of parochial schools. Since the so-called public schools are
really religious schools permeated either by the Protestant
ethic or the religion of "secular humanism," 1 that equality
of treatment can only be secured by equality of aid. Probably
the most frequently suggested argument was that Catholic
tax-payers, who have their taxes used for an educational system that they cannot use, are subjected to double taxation
because they also have to pay for the educational system that
they do use.
The policy arguments on the other side were not so much
against parochial schools as they were favorable to the public
schools. The major premise was that the public school system
was the essential unifying force in the pluralistic society
in which we live. In Professor Alexander Bickel's words :1"
"Culturally, no doubt the most significant nationalizing,
egalitarian force, by which we have set immense store for
a hundred years, has been the free public school system."
It was argued "that the public school, as the ally of social
tolerance, class fluidity, and the open mind, is so valuable
that alternatives to it should not be encouraged and certainly should not receive public support."' 8 The private
school was a divisive force. Aiding existing parochial schools
would be a serious enough threat to the public school system,
but worse, federal aid would encourage the proliferation of
16. Probably no greater damage has been done to the possibility of a rational
interpretation of the religion clauses of the First Amendment than the
Supreme Court's concession to the Catholic position that secular humanism
is a religion. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n. 11 (1961).
17. BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT 202 (1966).
18. See CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, RELIGION AND
AMEmcAN SOCIETY. 49 (1961).
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such schools. For many on this side of the question, segregation of school children by religion was at least as bad as
segregation by race. And, since there were not sufficient
resources available, even through federal aid, to secure high
enough standards for public education, the proposition was
that none of these scarce resources ought to be dispersed
among those who voluntarily rejected the common school
room to set up a system of their own. There were those, of
course, who also expatiated on the evils of the parochialism
of a parochial school system. And argument was presentedfrequently by non-religious sources-that government aid
would mean government control destructive of the religious
values that these schools now afford.
It is trite to point out that principle is not the fundamental guide to legislative action. Politics, it has been said,
is the "systematic pursuit of expediency." And no better
evidence is available than this history of the general aid-toeducation law. Expediency dictated the inclusion in the legislation of aid to parochial education. Expediency also explains why so much of the problem was not resolved by the
statute but was rather turned over to the executive branch
of government for resolution. The larger the constituency,
the smaller the power of any given pressure group. Every
legislative constituency is necessarily smaller than that of
the national executive. And the national executive in turn
was given the opportunity to pass on some of the hard problems to local communities with homogeneous interests to be
satisfied rather than pluralistic conflicts to be exacerbated.
Under title I of the Act, which provides for an expenditure of over one billion dollars, the benefits to private
schools could take any or all of several forms. Probably the
most important is the possibility of financing "shared-time"
or "dual enrollment" programs, by which parochial school
students will receive some of their education, most likely
science, mathematics and language instruction, in public
schools established sufficiently close to parochial schools so
that the students can take their humanities and social science
instructions unider church auspices. That such programs can
provide substantial succor for a financially pressed parohttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol1/iss2/5
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chial system is patent. The only potentially restrictive factor
is one that Congress did not write into the law but expressed
in a committee report, where it said: "[I] t is the committee's
expectation that the arrangements will be administered in
such a manner as to avoid classes which are separated by
religious affiliation. '" 1
Under this same title, other substantial benefits can be
made available: public school teachers may be provided for
parochial schools to meet "special educational needs of educationally deprived children." And there will be available
to church-school students, "broadened health services, school
breakfasts . . ., guidance and counseling services, as well as
special educational programs."
Under title II of the Act, with a budget of $100,000,000,
"library resources, textbooks ... [and] other instructional
materials" will be afforded parochial school students, but
"only those materials which have been approved for use in
public schools may be made available." Parochial schools
will also participate in the direction of and benefits from
the supplemental educational centers and services provided
by title III's $100,000,000. In the committee's language:
"[I]t is intended that local public educational agency . . .
will have wide latitude in fashioning programs of direct
benefit and advantage to elementary and secondary school
pupils regardless of ihether they are enrolled in public
schools." (Emphasis added.)
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
which had so conveniently supplied President Kennedy with
an opinion in support of his conclusion of unconstitutionality
of aid to parochial schools, proved equally ready to indorse
the Johnson bill as within the limits of the First Amendment.
This fact demonstrates either the very thin line between
constitutionality and unconstitutionality or the capacity of
a department's legal office to accommodate the law of the
constitution to the will of the chief executive. Or, it may
mean that in one opinion or the other, the Department was
just plain wrong.
19. This and the quotations immediately following were taken from S. REP. No.
146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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This brings me to the state of constitutional development
against which the act will be tested. Remember that the role
of the Court purports to be different from that of the legislature. The issue in the courts is not supposed to be whether
the statute's provisions are desirable or undesirable but
rather the legislature has clearly exceeded the limits of its
authority fixed by the Constitution. Moreover, the issue will
not be presented in the abstract fashion of legislative debate,
but rather in terms of the grant or denial of funds or the
method of their use in specific cases. Since these facts cannot be fully anticipated in advance of the litigation that will
arrive at the Court, final judgment must await the presentation of such a case of controversy on a hard record.
The fact is, however, that if the issues deriving from
the statute were to arrive at the Supreme Court tomorrow,
there would be neither precedent nor principle available to
resolve them. The Court's judgments in the area of church
and state are even more eclectic than its decisions in other
areas of constitutional law. In the specific field of education, there are but half a dozen "decisions that are relevant
and none is close to being decisive.
Probably the earliest decision of the Court meriting
consideration in this context is the case of Pierce v. Society
of Sisters,0 but not for the reasons usually offered. The
case raised no church-state issues; the Court decided no
church-state issues. Indeed, no reference to the First Amendment is made anywhere in the Court's opinion.
In 1922, the State of Oregon, under the initiative provision of its constitution, adopted a statute that, for all relevant purposes, made attendance at public schools within the
state compulsory. The statute was challenged, even before
it was to become effective, by the Society of Sisters, an Oregon
corporation that conducted a parochial school, and by Hill
Military Academy. The primary reliance of the schools was
on decisions such as the Child Labor Tax Case2 and Cop2
page v. Kansas.
In short, the arguments put forth were
in terms of the "substantive due process" cases that have
20. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
21. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).

22. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
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long since been interred along with the notion that the principles of Spencer's Social Statics were incorporated in the
Constitution." At that time, however, the Court was still
enthralled and the opinion by Mr. Justice McReynolds reads
accordingly.
The other major emphasis of the Court was based on
Meyer v. Nebraska" which had held unconstitutional a state
statute making it illegal to teach any modern language other
than English. The Meyer case established for the Court the
proposition that there could be no interference with the
liberty of parents by "forcing [their children] to accept
instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the
mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct
his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." 2" The
decision was as applicable to the military academy as to the
parochial school. In no way did it rest on any concept of
"freedom of religion."
Nor is the second relevant decision valid for the position for which it is usually cited. Cochran v. Board of Education2 6 sustained the constitutionality of a state expenditure
for textbooks for private schools. But again the issue was
not arising under the religion clauses of the First Amendment. As of the time of decisions in Pierce and Cochvran, the
Supreme Court had not yet discovered that the First Amendment's religion clauses, the language of which is addressed
solely to Congress, were applicable to the states. 7 For this
reason both decisions are peripheral to the federal aid to
education laws. Both opinions, however, contain dicta or
reasons that do, indeed, bear on the judgments to be rendered
on the subject of our immediate interest.
When Everson v. Board of Education" came before the
Court in 1947, it was able to write on a comparatively clean
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 158
(Kurland ed. 1965).
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Note 20 supra at 535.
281 U.S. 370 (1930).
See Howe, The ConstitutionalQuestion, in FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC, RELIGION
AND THE FREE SOCmTY 49 (1958).
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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slate, at least insofar as the Court's judgments rather than
its dicta were concerned. This litigation arose out of payments made by the township of Ewing, New Jersey to parents
of parochial school children in reimbursement for the costs
of transportation of those children to their school. A taxpayer of the township took exception to the payments and
brought suit to effectuate his objections.
Mr. Justice Black's opinion, for a five-man majority,
first disposes of the argument that the payments were illegal
because they required the taking of some persons' property
for the private use of others. This, it will be recalled, was
the major emphasis of the appellants in the Cochran case
and the argument was quickly disposed of on that authority.
It is much too late to argue that legislation intended
to facilitate the opportunity of children to get a secular education serves no public purpose.... The same
thing is no less true of legislation to reimburse needy
parents, or all parents, for payment of the fares of
their children so that they can ride in public buses to
and from schools rather than run the risk of traffic
and other
hazards incident to walking or "hitch,29
hiking.

With reference to the First Amendment problem, Black's
conclusion from history and the scanty precedents was set
out in language that has become the classic base for all arguments relevant to the establishment clause:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the
First Amendment means at least this: Neither a
state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or
to remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.
No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called,
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government
29. Id. at 7.
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can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of
any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a
wall of separation between church and State.""0
The additional language that Black used has also been offered
by both sides in the school-aid controversy and reads like
this:
New Jersey cannot consistently with the "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which teaches the tenets and faith of any
church. On the other hand, other language of the
amendment commands that New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own
religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude individual
Catholics, Lutherans, Mohamnedans, Baptists, Jews,
Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the
members of any other faith, because of their faith, or
lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation. While we do not mean to intimate
that a state could not provide transportation only
to children attending public schools, we must be careful, in protecting the citizens of New Jersey against
state-established churches, to be sure that we do not
inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from extending
its general state law benefits to all its citizens without
regard to their religious belief. 1
This clearly says that a legislative classification in terms
of public and non-public schools would be valid. A classification in terms of religion, however, would be invalid. This
proposition is again emphasized in the Court's opinion at a
later point. In sustaining the validity of the New Jersey
action in question, the opinion said: "Its legislation, as applied, does no more than provide a general program to help
parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely
and expeditiously to and from accredited schools." 3"
In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Jackson suggested
that any payment to parochial schools would fall under the
constitutional ban, whether the contribution was going to all
30. Id. at 15-16.
31. Id. at 16. (Emphasis not added.)
32. Id. at 18.
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schools or not. For Jackson, aid to a "Church school is
indistinguishable . . . from rendering the same aid to the
Church itself."" He reached this conclusion because of his
characterization of Catholic schools as "a vital, if not the
most vital, part of the Roman Catholic Church." 3 4 And, he
went on, "It is of no importance in this situation whether the
beneficiary of this expenditure of tax-raised funds is primarily the parochial school and incidentally the pupil or
whether the aid is directly bestowed on the pupil with indirect benefits to the school.""
Mr. Justice Rutledge read the Constitution to outlaw
all use of public funds for religious purposes. 6 For him:
"Legislatures are free to make, and courts to sustain, appropriations only when it can be found that in fact they do
not aid, promote, encourage or sustain religious teaching or
observances, be the amount large or small.""7
The next relevant decisions concern the problem of
segregating school children within their schools, for part of
the time, by religious classifications. This was a classification
not so ancient as the South's color segregation, but it was
far more widespread in the United States. The system of
released-time was first challenged in the Supreme Court in
McCollurn v. Board of Education2 In Champaign, Illinois,
students were released from their public school classes for
a period of thirty or forty-five minutes each week so that
they might take religious instruction. This instruction was
given on the school premises by teachers approved but not
employed by the public school. It was given in the regular
classrooms to those students whose parents indicated that
they desired their children to take such instruction. Students
who did not take religious instruction were required to leave
their classrooms to continue their secular studies elsewhere
in the building. Student attendance at the religious classes
was reported to the school authorities. Mr. Justice Black,
33. Id. at 24.

84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.

36. Id. at 58.
37. Id. at 52-58.

38. 833 U.S. 203 (1948).
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writing for the Court, had little difficulty in disposing of
the case.
Pupils compelled by law to go to school for secular
education are released in part from their legal duty
upon the condition that they attend the religious
classes. This is beyond all question a utilization of
the tax-established and tax-supported public school
system to aid religious groups to spread their faith.
And it falls squarely under the ban of the First
Amendment (made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth) as we interpreted it in Everson. ..."
The ban did not last very long. When the issue was
again presented to the Court a few years later, in Zorach v.
Clauson, ° it found the New York City released-time program
valid. Factually, the only difference between the Champaign
and New York City programs was that the students released
to take religious education in New York left the school
premises in order to do so. Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion for
the majority almost conceded this to be the only distinction,
but regarded it as a distinction that made a difference.
The author of the McCollum opinion, Mr. Justice Black,
was unable to recognize the difference. Mr. Justice Black's
dissent pointed out: "As we attempted to make categorically
clear, the McCollum decision would have been the same if
the religious classes had not been held in the school buildings. ""' "McCollum . . .held that Illinois could not constitutionally manipulate the compelled classroom hours of its
compulsory school machinery so as to channel children into
sectarian classes." 4 2 The compulsion exerted in Zorach was
neither less nor different from that held invalid in McCollum.
He concluded:
State help to religion injects political and party
prejudices into a holy field. It too often substitutes
force for prayer, hate for love, and persecution for
persuasion. Government should not be allowed,
under the cover of the soft euphemism of "co-operation," to steal into the sacred area or religious
choice."
89.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 209-10.
343 U.S. 306 (1952).
Id. at 816.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 320.
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It can readily be seen that the decisions through both
released-time cases hardly provide an answer to the question
of government aid to parochial schools. The only other cases
directly related to the subject matter are no more enlightening. Despite the furor that followed them, the recent decisions
holding school prayers and bible reading illegal, which need
no restatement here, are of very limited consequence." This,
and only this, can be derived in certainty from these cases:
neither the state nor federal government is allowed by the
Constitution to prescribe the conduct of religious ceremonies
in the public schools.
If the Supreme Court's judgments provide little basis
for decision of the issues presented by the aid-to-education
bill, neither do the recent decisions of the state high courts.
For example, the Connecticut and Maine courts have recently
upheld the validity of state payments for bus transportation
for parochial school pupils," but the high courts of Wisconsin
and Alaska have even more recently held to the contrary. 6
This in the face of the decision in Everson sustaining such
payments. Oregon, despite the Cochran case, has held that
supplying text books to church school pupils is unconstitutional. And in Vermont, where school districts pay tuition
for students from the district who attend school in another
district, it was held invalid to pay such tuition to a parochial
school, despite the Pierce case."' These samples reveal closely
divided state courts trying to divine the meaning of the
Supreme Court's rulings.
The essential problem is the absence of principle on which
judgment might be based. The Supreme Court opinions have
been wordy but not weighty. Certainly it is true, as Professor
Paul Freund, the dean of American constitutional law professors, has said: "A course of decisions may be principled
44. See Kurland, The School Prayer Cases, in OAKS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 142.
45. Snyder v. Town of Newton, 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770 (1960), appeal
dismissed 365 U.S. 299 (1961); Squires v. City of Augusta, 155 Me. 151,
153 A.2d 80 (1959) (dictum).
46. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wisc.2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962); Matthews
v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961), appeal dismissed and cert. denied,
368 U.S. 517 (1962).
47. Dickman v. School Dist., 232 Ore. 238, 366 P.2d 533 (1961), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 823 (1962).
48. Swart v. South Burlington Town School Dist., 122 Vt. 177, 167 A.2d 514
(1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 925 (1961).
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But not even he has shown
without being doctrinaire."
what the principles might be that underlie the decisions in
this area. After examining the judicial literature one is
tempted to agree that Mr. Justice Jackson might have spoken
the truth in the first released-time case when he stated: "It
is idle to pretend that this task is one for which we can find
in the Constitution one word to help us as judges to decide
. ***Nor can we find guidance in any other legal source. It
is a matter on which we can find no law but our own prepossessions." 5 In short, in Jackson's view, the judicial approach
has been the same as the legislature's.
What then will be the basis for argument before the
high tribunal when the issues arrive there ? If the results
are not predictable, the arguments are, in large measure
because they have been so frequently mooted in periodical
literature and books devoted to the subject.
The strongest argument to sustain not only this statute
but even more general aid to parochial schools derives from
the Pierce case, despite the fact that that decision was not
based on the religion clause of the First Amendment. This
argument is that "public money... cannot logically be withheld from the private school if it is publicly accredited as an
institution where children may fulfill their legal duty to
attend school."'" And, because of Pierce,the state must make
it possible for a parochial school to be accredited in this
fashion. According to this argument, parochial schools are
in a different category from any other function of a church
because of the fact that the church has been allocated a public
duty to perform in the area of primary education. Certainly,
Pierce could be overruled, especially since it rests largely on
a philosophy of economic substantive due process long since
rejected by the Court. But this is not likely. Nor is it likely,
however, that the Court will make the direct confrontation
that Pierce would enforce on it.
Before I turn to the issue that the Court will probably
regard as the one that it can best handle in accordance with
49. FREUND & ULICH, RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 12 (1965).
50. Note 38 supra at 237-38.
61. Drinan, op. cit. supra note 7, at 60.
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its ad hoc methods, let me state what I regard as the weakest
of the arguments for support of parochial schools, but one
that is most frequently asserted. It is, in effect, that failure
to provide aid to parochial schools constitutes an infringement of religious liberty and that the function of the establishment clause is to serve only as an adjunct of the freedom
clause. Therefore, as William Gorman puts it:
To be sure, governmental action taken to avoid
abridgement of religious liberty would indirectly
entail "aid to religion." And, to be sure, the distinction between direct aid to religion and indirect
aid resulting from concern for religious liberty might,
in the first instance, be something too subtle for the
understanding of "ordinary people." But surely it
is precisely the function of the legal art, as exercised
by judges and by jurisprudents in the schools of law,
to make and then effectively teach whatever subtle
distinctions the doing of justice requires.'"'
The quick and simple answer is that Gorman's major premise
is in error. As Professor Freund has said:
The nonestablishment clause is not merely a means to
assure free exercise. The free-exercise guarantee is
not absolute; it must yield when it invades a paramount concern of public order. The nonestablishment
guarantee is directed at public aid to the religious
activities of religious groups; but since these are
commonly intertwined with other activities, philanthropic and educational, some incidental aid is valid,
as in the case of school bus fares or public aid to
church-related hospitals."
It is to this question of incidental or indirect aid that
the Court is most likely to address itself in seeking a solution
to the problems that will come before it as a result of the
1965 statute. For the statute itself avoids any issue of direct
aid. And both the "liberals" and the Catholics are prepared
to rest their case on the propriety of indirect aid. But this
is largely a shift in rhetoric rather than substance.
For some Catholics, as we have seen, even direct subsidies
for parochial schools may be labeled indirect assistance. For
52. Gorman, Problems of Church and State in the United States: A Catholic
View in OARS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 49.
53. FI uNI & ULmCH, op. cit. supra note 49, at 11.
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many proponents of the statute, so long as the major objective
is not aid to religious institutions but education of children,
the assistance may be sustained as indirect or incidental. The
anti-aid group made up, according to Professor Katz," of
most non-Catholic lawyers has a different theory. For them
aid is indirect only if it is administered and controlled by
secular or governmental agencies. For those in the middle,
the issue is whether the particular program being supported
has a significant religious content. If, as in the case of science
training, the religious content is deemed minimal, federal
aid is proper. If, on the other hand, the training is in social
sciences, where the religious content is substantial, aid would
be improper. And, indeed, it is on this last thesis that Congress would seem to have rested its legislation.
Most of the uncommitted legal scholars, that is those not
governed by either the Catholic or the separationist ideology,
would seem to support the distinction between direct and indirect aid. For example, Professor Mark de Wolfe Howe of
Harvard told the Senate committee: "I am satisfied that
a valid line can be drawn between government support of
activities that are predominantly of civil concern and those
which are predominantly of religious significance."" (Parenthetically, it should be pointed out that the entire Catholic
case for maintaining a separate school system is that such
a line is impossible to draw.) It is interesting to note that
Professor Howe was also of the view that as a matter of
legislative policy, aid to parochial schools was undesirable."
Professor Wilber G. Katz and Professor Arthur Sutherland
are in agreement with Professor Howe on the constitutional
question. 7 And Professor Paul G. Kauper has reached the
conclusion that direct aid would be invalid but indirect aid
of the kind promoted by the 1965 statute will be held valid."
For myself, I find the distinction offered between direct
and indirect aid of little merit, whether it is justified on the
ground that the indirect aid supports only secular activities
or on the ground that the aid is to the students rather than
54.

KATz,

55.
56.
57.
58.

Ibid.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 74.
KAUER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 112-13 (1964).

REIuGION AND AMImCAN

CONSTITUTIONS 73 (1964).
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to the institution. In effect the assistance offered 'does not
differ from direct aid. "[T]he sectarian institution will be
strengthened in its religious activities both because its own
funds will be freed for religious use and because it will be
able to subject more students to religious training. "5 If direct
aid is invalid, then I see little way to avoid the conclusion that
indirect aid is also invalid. I do not agree, however, that
direct aid is invalid.
As a matter of legislative policy I regret and should have
voted against provision for federal aid to private elementary
and secondary schools. I find the potential values to our
society from unsegregated public school education so great as
to require the concentration of public funds for theix support.
The problem of constitutionality I find more difficult. Given
the Pierce case which tells us that the Constitution requires
that the public function of educating our children for American citizenship must be delegated to private schools at the
parents' behest, I find it difficult to conclude that direct,
nondiscriminatory aid cannot be afforded those schools performing that public function. My position may appear somewhat anomolous, however, for if it would sustain direct aid
for parochial schools it would reject as unconstitutional aid
by way of shared-time, which is the major form of relief
afforded parochial schools by the 1965 legislation. For as I
see it, there is no rationale for dividing pupils between public
and private schools in the manner that most shared-time programs would do except to relieve the financial burden of the
parochial schools. Programs that have no rationale except
benefit for church schools, I find clearly violative of the establishment clause of the First Amendment.6" But wiser men
than I have asserted that shared-time is both a desirable and
a constitutional concept."
In conclusion, I would offer a quotation from my favorite
author, made in the heat of the controversy over the Kennedy
bill, when he wrote: "Anyone suggesting that the answer,
as a matter of constitutional law, is clear one way or the other
59. Note 15 supra, at 1354.
60. See KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW (1962).
61. See Katz, Note on the Constitutionality of Shared Time, 1964 RELIGION
AND THE PUBIJC ORDER 85.
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is either deluded or 'deluding." 2 On the other hand Mr. J ustice Douglas has announced that even indirect aid to parochial schools is unconstitutional. 3 And he iscloser to the seat
of judgment than I am.

62. KURLAND, op. cit. supra note 60, at 111.
63. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, supra note 3, at 229 (concurring).
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